

# PRÉCIS OF "OUR FATE: ESSAYS ON GOD AND FREE WILL"

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In *Our Fate* I present a family of arguments for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise. The arguments are fueled by the intuitive idea of the fixity of the past. I distinguish different versions of the argument, and I contend that it is important to see that the arguments are different, even though they are motivated by the same basic intuitive ideas. One reason that it is important to distinguish the different members of the family is because we can thereby see that incompatibilism is not defeated, simply in virtue of showing the inadequacy of one particular version of the argument. I also reflect on the relationship between these arguments for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise and similar arguments for logical fatalism and for the incompatibility of causal determinism and human freedom to do otherwise.

I also consider various important responses to the argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise, including responses inspired by (or based on material in) Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Luis de Molina. I criticize these responses, with particular emphasis on "Ockhamism". In the end, I find the argument for incompatibilism about God's foreknowledge and human freedom to do otherwise compelling, *albeit* not apodictic.

I also give a new account of God's foreknowledge of future contingents positing free human actions in a causally indeterministic world. Many philosophers have thought that God could not have certain knowledge of future contingents in a causally indeterministic world, but I argue that this is false, and I attempt to show why.

Finally, I argue for Semicompatibilism about God's foreknowledge and human freedom. Elsewhere, I have defended Semicompatibilism about causal determinism and human freedom. Semicompatibilism holds that causal determination is consistent with acting freely, even if causal determination rules out freedom to do otherwise. (Obviously, this commits the Semicompatibilist to the claim that acting freely does not require freedom to do otherwise; Semicompatibilism is thus an "actual-sequence" theory of moral responsibility). In *Our Fate* I argue for Semicompatibilism about God's foreknowledge and human freedom. That is, I argue that God's foreknowledge is consistent with acting freely, even if it rules out freedom to do otherwise. In fact, Semicompatibilism is easier to defend in this context than in the context of causal determinism, insofar as God's foreknowledge need not play any role in the actual sequence of events leading to the action in question.