Fischer’s Fate with Fatalism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.2027Abstract
John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argument for logical fatalism. I then point out some of the costs of Fischer’s reasoning that come into focus once we notice that the set of hard facts is closed under entailment.References
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