Fischer and the Fixity of the Past
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.2028References
Fischer, John Martin. 1984. “Power over the Past.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4): 335–50. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1984.tb00234.x.
—. 1985. “Scotism.” Mind XCIV (374): 231–43. doi:10.1093/mind/XCIV.374.231.
—. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Oxford: Blackwell.
—. 2011. ‘Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past’. Philosophia, 39 (3): 461–74. doi:10.1007/s11406-011-9308-7. Reprinted as Chapter 6 of Fischer 2016.
—. 2016. Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fischer, J. M. and Pendergraft, G. 2013. ‘Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?’ Philosophical Studies, 166 (3): 575–95. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0053-y.
Fischer, John Martin, Patrick Todd, and Neal A. Tognazzini. 2009. “Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time.” Philosophical Papers 38 (2): 247–70. doi:10.1080/05568640903146542. Reprinted as Chapter 9 of Fischer 2016.
Gallois, Andre Norman. 2009. “The Fixity of Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 146 (2): 233–48. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9253-x.
Horgan, Terence E. 1985. “Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument.” Philosophical Studies 47 (3): 339–56. doi:10.1007/BF00355208.
David Lewis. 1981. “Are we free to break the laws?” Theoria 47 (3): 113–21. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00473.x.
Mackie, Penelope. 2003. “Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power To Do Otherwise.” Noûs 37 (4): 672–89. doi:10.1046/j.1468-0068.2003.00455.x.
