No Hope in the Dark: Problems for four-dimensionalism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2958Keywords:
Four-dimensionalism, Temporal parts, Personal Identity, Resurrection, Metaphysics, Materialism, Physicalism, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Religion, Hud Hudson, David Lewis, Hope, Analytic Theology, van Inwagen, Life after death, Persistence, SurvivalAbstract
Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism. I present two difficulties unique to Hudson’s view. The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate adequately prudential concern about one’s future self. More significantly, the second problem of quasi hope demonstrates that even if a temporal parts view can accommodate the possibility of future resurrection it necessarily leaves human beings in the dark about their individual futures and thus incapable of hope. I conclude that whatever its merits in demonstrating the possibility of resurrection, four-dimensionalist materialism cannot accommodate veridical Christian hope.
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