Another Look at the Modal Collapse Argument
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v13i1.3168Keywords:
Classical Theism, Absolute Divine Simplicity, Divine Action, Modal CollapseAbstract
On one classical conception of God, God has no parts, not even metaphysical parts. God is not composed of form and matter, act and potency, and he is not composed of existence and essence. God is absolutely simple. This is the doctrine of Absolute Divine Simplicity (ADS). It is claimed that ADS implies a modal collapse, i.e. that God’s creation is absolutely necessary. I argue that a proper way of understanding the modal collapse argument naturally leads the proponent of ADS to reject a particular premise of the argument: namely, “the same identical cause brings about the same effect.” However, I argue that the rejection of that premise leads to a deeper problem for ADS. It leads to an explanatory gap: how can we explain the relevant type of indeterminism in an absolutely simple God?
References
References
Bradshaw, D. (2010). Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the division of Christendom. Milton Keynes UK: Lightning Source.
Brower, J. (2008). “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity.” Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 3-30.
Brower, J. (2009). “Simplicity and Aseity.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Thomas p. Flint & Michael
C. Rea (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 105-128.
Buchak, L. (2013). “Free Acts and Chance: Why the Rollback Argument Fails.” The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 63, pp. 20-28.
Dancy, J. (2010). Moral reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.
Davidson, D. (1963). “Actions, Reasons and Causes.” Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 60, No. 23, pp. 685–700.
Dolezal, J. E. (2011). God without parts: Divine Simplicity and the metaphysics of God’s absoluteness. Eugene, Or: Pickwick Publications.
Farris, J. R., & Hamilton, S. M. (2017). Idealism and Christian theology. Idealism and Christianity, Vol. 1. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Grant, W. M. (2007). “Must a Cause be Really Related to Its Effect? The Analogy Between Divine and Libertarian Agent Causality.” Religious Studies. Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 1-23.
Grant, W. M. (2010). “Can a Libertarian Hold That Our Free Acts Are Caused By God?” Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 22-44.
Grant, W. M. (2012). “Divine Simplicity, Contingent Truths, and Extrinsic Models of divine Knowing.” Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 254-274.
Grant, W. M. (2019). Free will and God's universal causality: The dual sources account. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Hacking, I. (1965). The logic of statistical inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Hájek, A. (2012). “Interpretations of Probability.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Winter Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/probability-interpret/>.
Hughes, C. (1989). On a complex theory of a simple God. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Hughes, G. (1995) The nature of God. London: Routledge.
Immink, F. D. (1987). Divine simplicity. Kampen: Kok.
Kane, R. (2004). The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Kane, R. (2005). A contemporary introduction to free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koons, R. C. (2018). “Divine Persons as Relational Qua-Objects.” Religious Studies. Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 337-357.
Leftow, B. (1990). “Is God an Abstract Object?” Noûs. Vol. 24, pp. 581–598.
Leftow, B. (2006). “Divine Simplicity.” Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 23, pp. 365–380.
Mann, W. E. (1985). “Epistemology Supernaturalized.” Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 436-456.
Mann, W. E. (2015). God, modality, and morality. Corby: Oxford University Press.
Marcus, E. (2012). Rational causation. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Miller, D. W. (1994). Critical rationalism: A restatement and defence. Lasalle, Il: Open Court.
Mullins, R. (2016). The end of the timeless God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Connor, T. (1999). “Simplicity and Creation.” Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 405-412.
Oppy, G. (2003). “The Devilish Complexities of Divine Simplicity.” Philo. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 10-22.
Plantinga, A. (2003). Does God have a nature?. Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press.
Popper, K. R. (1957). “The Propensity Interpretation of the Calculus of Probability and the Quantum Theory.” in S. Körner (ed.). The Colston Papers. Vol. 9, pp. 65–70.
Pruss, A. (2008) “On Two Problems of Divine Simplicity.” In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, Vol. 1, pp. 150–167.
Pruss, A. R. (2011). The principle of sufficient reason: A reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Radde-Gallwitz, A. (2013). Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the transformation of divine simplicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rogers, K. (1996). “The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity.” Religious Studies. Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 165-186.
Stump, E. & Kretzmann, N. (1985). “Absolute Simplicity.” Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 2, pp. 353–391.
Stump, E. (2003). Aquinas. New York, NY: Routledge.
Stump, E. (2012). “God’s Simplicity.” In the Oxford Handbook of Aquinas. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 135-146.
Swinburne, R. (2007). The Christian God. Oxford [England: Clarendon Press.
Tomaszewski, C. (forthcoming). “Collapsing the Modal Collapse Argument: On an Invalid Argument Against Divine Simplicity.” Analysis. any052, < https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any052>, pp. 1-10.
Van Inwagen, P. (1983). An essay on free will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wolterstorff, N. (1991). “Divine Simplicity.” Philosophical perspectives. Vol. 5, pp. 531-552.
