Methodological Naturalism and Scientific Success
Lessons from the Realism Debate
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2021.3403Keywords:
methodological naturalism, success of science, arguments for naturalismAbstract
Several metaphysical naturalists argue that the success of science, together with the claim that scientists adhere to methodological naturalism, amounts to strong evidence for metaphysical naturalism. I call this the scientific-success argument. It is argued that the scientific-success argument is similar to the no-miracles argument for realism in philosophy of science. On the no-miracles argument, the success of science is taken as strong evidence that scientific theories are (approximately) true. Based on this similarity, some considerations relevant to one argument may also be relevant to the other. One particular consideration is explored. The selectionist response to the no-miracles argument states that on an evolutionary model of science, in which scientific theories are accepted only after surviving a rigorous selection process, the no-miracles argument fails. The selectionist response also applies to the scientific-success argument. If scientific theories are selected for success, we do not need to explain the success of science by appealing to metaphysical naturalism.
References
Barnes, E. C. (2002). The miraculous choice argument for realism. Philosophical Studies, 111(2), 97–120.
Boudry, M., Blancke, S., & Braeckman, J. (2010). How not to attack intelligent design creationism. Foundations of Science, 15, 227–244.
Boyce, K. (2018). The coincidentalist reply to the no-miracles argument. Erkenn, 83, 929–946.
Churchland, P. M. (1985). The ontological status of unobservables: In praise of the superempirical virtues. In P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (Eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen (pp. 35–47). University of Chicago Press.
Diez, J. (2007). Falsificationism and the structure of theories: The Popper-Kuhn controversy about the rationality of normal science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 38, 543–554.
Draper, P. (2005). God, Science, and Naturalism. In W. J. Wainwright (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion (pp. 272–303). Oxford University Press.
Einstein, A. (1954). Ideas and Opinions. Crown Publishers.
Forrest, B. (2000). Philosophical naturalism and methodological naturalism: Clarifying the connection. Philo, 3, 7–29.
Halvorson, H. (2016). Why Methodological Naturalism. In K. J. Clark (Ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism (1st ed., pp. 136–149). Blackwell.
Harrison, P. (2020). Naturalism and the success of science. Religious Studies, 56, 274–291.
Keeley, B. L. (2016). Natural Mind. In K. J. Clark (Ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism (1st ed., pp. 196–208). Blackwell.
Kitcher, P. (1993). The advancement of science: Science without legend, objectivity without illusions. Oxford University Press.
Kvanvig, J. L. (1994). A critique of van Fraassen’s voluntaristic epistemology. Synthese, 98(2), 325–348.
Laudan, L. (1984). Explaining the Success of Science: Beyond Epistemic Realism and Relativism. In J. Cushing, C. F. Delaney, & G. Gutting (Eds.), Science and Reality (pp. 83–105). University of Notre Dame Press.
Leplin, J. (1997). A novel defense of scientific realism. Oxford University Press.
Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the best explanation (2nd ed.). Routledge.
Mahner, M. (2012). The role of metaphysical naturalism in science. Science & Education, 21, 1437–1459.
Newton, I. (1978). Isaac Newton’s Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy (B. Cohen, Ed.; 2nd ed.). Harvard University Press.
Papineau, D. (2020). Naturalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/naturalism/
Plantinga, A. (1997). Methodological Naturalism? Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 49, 143–154.
Popper, K. (1958). The logic of scientific discovery. Hutchinson.
Psillos, S. (1996). On van Fraassen’s critique of abductive reasoning. The Philosophical Quarterly, 46(182), 31–47.
Psillos, S. (2007). The fine structure of inference to the best explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(2), 441–448.
Putnam, H. (1975). What is mathematical truth. Historia Mathematica, 2, 529–543.
Rea, M. C. (2002). World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism. Oxford University Press.
Rosenberg, A. (2014). Disenchanted naturalism. In B. Bashour & H. D. Muller (Eds.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications (pp. 17–36). Routledge.
Ruse, M. (2005). Methodological naturalism under attack. South African Journal of Philosophy, 24(1), 44–60.
Salmon, W. C. (1971). Statistical explanation. In W. C. Salmon, R. C. Jeffrey, & J. G. Greeno, Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance (pp. 29–87). University of Pittsburgh Press.
Salmon, W. C. (1989). Four decades of scientific explanation. University of Pittsburgh Press.
Sober, E. (2009). Did Darwin write the Origin backwards? Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106, 10048–10055.
Sober, E. (2011). Why Methodological Naturalism? In M. Leclerc, G. Aulette, & R. Martines (Eds.), Biological Evolution-Facts and Theories, A Critical Appraisal 150 Years After “The Origin of Species” (pp. 359–378). Gregorian Biblical Press.
Swinburne, R. (1997). Simplicity as Evidence for Truth. Marquette University Press.
Torrance, A. B. (2017). Should a Christian adopt methodological naturalism? Zygon, 52(3), 691–725.
van Fraassen, B. (1980). The scientific image. Clarendon Press.
van Fraassen, B. (2002). The empirical stance. Yale University Press.
Wray, K. B. (2007). A selectionist explanation for the success and failures of science. Erkenntnis, 67, 81–89.
Wray, K. B. (2010). Selection and predictive success. Erkenntnis, 72, 365–377.
